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Abstract—This paper investigates the problem of database-
assisted spectrum access in dynamic TV white spectrum net-
works, in which the active user set is varying. Since there is
no central controller and information exchange, it encounters
dynamic and incomplete information constraints. To solve this
challenge, we formulate a state-based spectrum access game and a
robust spectrum access game. It is proved that the two games are
ordinal potential games with the (expected) aggregate weighted
interference serving as the potential functions. A distributed
learning algorithm is proposed to achieve the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (NE) of the games. It is shown that the best NE is
almost the same with the optimal solution and the achievable
throughput of the proposed learning algorithm is very close to
the optimal one, which validates the effectiveness of the proposed
game-theoretic solution.
Index Terms—TV white spectrum, geo-location database, or-
dinal potential game, learning automata.
I. INTRODUCTION
EMPLOYING TV White Spectrum (TVWS) [1]–[3] hasbeen regarded as a promising approach to solve the spec-
trum shortage problem in future wireless networks, as it can
effectively improve the spectrum efficiency by allowing the
unlicensed users dynamically to access the idle TV channels.
For the TVWS, it has been shown that obtaining the spectrum
availability information by inquiring a geo-location database
is more efficient than performing spectrum sensing alone [4],
[5]. Also, geo-location database has been widely supported by
the standards bodies and industrial organizations [6]–[9].
Currently, researchers in this field mainly focused on: i)
constructing and maintaining the geo-location database, e.g.,
[10]–[12], and ii) developing business models to analyze the
revenues of the TV spectrum holders and the unlicensed users,
e.g., [13]–[15]. Since there is no centralized controller avail-
able, how to choose a channel for transmission in a distributed
manner, aiming to avoid mutual interference among the users,
remains a key challenge. However, only a few preliminary
results were reported recently [16], [17], and hence it is urgent
and important to study efficient database-assisted distributed
spectrum access strategies.
In this paper, we consider a dynamic and distributed TVWS
network. Specifically, considering practical applications of the
users, they do not access the channels when there is no data to
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transmit. To capture this dynamics, it is assumed that each user
becomes active/inactive according to an active probability in
each decision period. As a result, the active user set is varying.
Furthermore, since there is no information exchange, a user
does not know the chosen channels, the current state (active
or inactive) and the active probabilities of other users. The
dynamic and incomplete information constraints make the task
of developing efficient distributed spectrum access strategies
challenging.
To solve this problem, we resort to game models [18]
and distributed learning technology. Specifically, we formulate
a state-based spectrum access game and a robust spectrum
access game, and propose a distributed learning to achieve
desirable solutions. The main contributions can be summarized
as follows:
1) For an arbitrary active user set, we formulate the prob-
lem of distributed spectrum access as a state-based non-
cooperative game. It is proved that state-based game is
an ordinal potential game with the aggregate weighted
interference serving as the potential function. To address
the challenges caused by the varying active user set,
we formulate a robust spectrum access game, which is
also proved to be a ordinal potential game. Finally, we
propose a distributed learning algorithm to achieve the
pure strategy Nash equilibria of the formulated games.
2) It is shown that the best Nash equilibrium is almost
the same with optimal solution, which validates the
effectiveness of the formulated game models. In addi-
tion, the achievable throughput of the proposed learning
algorithm is very close to the optimal one, which also
validates the distributed learning algorithm in dynamic
networks.
The most related work is [16], in which game-theoretic
database-assisted spectrum sharing strategies were investi-
gated. This work is differentiated in: i) all users are assumed
to be always active [16], while we consider a network with
varying number of active users, and iii) the spectrum ac-
cess algorithms in [16] need information exchange, while
the proposed learning-based spectrum access algorithm is
fully distributed. Also, the problem of distributed spectrum
access for minimizing the aggregate weighted interference
was studied in [19] and in our previous work [20], [21].
The differences in the current work are that we optimize the
throughput directly and the active user set in each decision
period is randomly changing. Also, some simulation results
on the problem of distributed spectrum access with changing
active user set were preliminarily reported in our recent work
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Fig. 1. The illustrative diagram of database-assisted spectrum access.
[22]. In this work, rigorous analysis and proofs are given and
more simulation results are presented to validate the proposed
game-theoretic solution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the system model and problem formulation are presented.
In Section III, we formulate the state-based spectrum access
game and the robust spectrum game respectively, analyze their
properties, and propose a distributed learning-based spectrum
access algorithm. Finally, simulation results and discussion are
presented in Section IV and conclusion is drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System model
We consider a distributed network with N cognitive users
and M channels. Note that here each cognitive user corre-
sponds to a communication link consisting of a transmitter
and a receiver, e.g., the cognitive access point (AP) and its
serving clients. Each cognitive user inquires the spectrum
availability from the geo-location spectrum database, which
specifies the available channel set An and the maximum
allowable transmission power Pn for each user n. With the
inquired information on the available channels and maximum
transmission power, the users take suitable spectrum access
strategies through learning. An illustration of the database-
assisted spectrum access is shown in Fig. 1.
To address the user traffic in practical applications, we
consider a network with a varying number of active users.
Specifically, it is assumed that each user performs channel
access in each slot with probability λn, 0 < λn ≤ 1. Such a
model captures general kinds of dynamics in wireless networks
[23], e.g., a user becomes active only when it has data to
transmit and inactive otherwise; also, it can be regarded as
a high-level abstraction of the user traffic, i.e., the active
probability corresponds to the probability of non-empty buffer.
B. Problem formulation
To capture the changing number of active users, we define
the system state as S = {s1, . . . , sN}, where sn = 1 indicates
that user n is active while sn = 0 means it is inactive. The
system state probability is then given by µ(s1, . . . , sN ) =∏N
n=1 pn, where pn is determined as follows:
pn =
{
λn, sn = 1
1− λn, sn = 0
(1)
Denote an arbitrary and non-empty active user set as B, i.e.,
B = {n ∈ N : sn = 1}. For presentation, denote the set of all
the active user sets as Γ. Then, the probability of an active user
set can denoted by µ(B). We have
∑
B∈Γ µ(B) = 1− µ(B0),
where µ(B0) =
∏N
n=1(1 − λn) is the probability that all the
users are inactive.
With the spectrum availability information obtained from
the database, user n chooses a channel an ∈ An for data
transmission. For any active user set B and channel selection
profile (an, a−n), the received Signal-to-Interference-plus-
Noise Ratio (SINR) of an active user n is determined by:
ηn(B, an, a−n) =
Pnd
−α
n∑
i∈B\{n}:ai=an
Pid
−α
in + σ
, (2)
where α is the path loss factor, dn is the distance between user
n and its dedicated receiver, din is the distance between user i
and n,
∑
i∈B\{n}:ai=an
Pid
−α
in +σ is the aggregate interference
from all other active users also choosing channel an, and σ
is the background noise. Then, the achievable throughput of
user n is given by:
Rn(B, an, a−n) = B log
(
1 + ηn(B, an, a−n)
)
, (3)
where B is the channel bandwidth. Therefore, there are two
possible optimization goals for each user, i.e.,
P1 : max
an
Rn(B, an, a−n), ∀B ∈ Γ, (4)
or
P2 : max
an
EB[Rn(B, an, a−n)] =
∑
B∈Γ
µ(B)Rn(B, an, a−n)
(5)
Since the network is always changing, it is not feasible
to optimize the achievable throughput for each active user
3set. Thus, we pay attention to solving P2. However, the task
of solving P2 is challenging due to the following imperfect
information constraints:
• Dynamic: the active user set in the system is always
changing; in particular, it may change randomly in each
decision period.
• Incomplete: there is no information exchange among the
users, which leads to: i) a user does not know the active
probabilities and chosen channels of other users, and ii)
the state distribution µ(B) is unknown to the all users.
Based on the above analysis, it is seen that centralized ap-
proaches are not available and we need to develop a distributed
and learning-based approach for solving problem P2.
III. SPECTRUM ACCESS GAMES AND DISTRIBUTED
LEARNING ALGORITHM
Since no centralized controller is available in the considered
distributed network and all the users take their spectrum access
strategies distributively and autonomously, we formulate this
problem as a non-cooperative game. In the following, we
present the formulated game models, analyze its properties,
and propose a distributed learning algorithm to converge to
stable solutions in dynamic environment.
A. Game formulation and analysis
In this subsection, we first present a state-based spectrum
access game, in which an inherent system state specifies the
active user set. Based on the state-based game, we then present
a robust game, in which the expectations over all possible
system states are considered. Note that the state-based game
corresponds to problem P1 while the robust game corresponds
to problem P2.
1) State-based spectrum access game: Formally, the state-
based spectrum access game model is denoted as F1 =
[N ,B, {An}n∈N , {un(B)}n∈N ], where N = {1, . . . , N} is
a set of players (users), B is active user set, An is a set of
available actions (channels) for user n, and un(B) is the utility
function of player n. The utility function is defined as the
available transmission, i.e.,
un(B, an, a−n) = Rn(B, an, a−n), ∀n ∈ N , ∀B ∈ Γ (6)
Each user is the game intends to maximize its individual utility,
which means that the state-based spectrum access game can
be expressed as:
(F1) : max
an∈An
un(B, an, a−n), ∀n ∈ B. (7)
In order to investigate the properties of F1, we first present
the following definitions, which is directly drawn from [24].
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium ). For an arbitrary active user
set B, a spectrum access profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗|B|) is a pure
strategy NE if and only if no player can improve its utility by
deviating unilaterally, i.e.,
un(B, a
∗
n, a
∗
−n) ≥ un(B, an, a
∗
−n), ∀n ∈ B, ∀an ∈ An, an 6= a
∗
n
(8)
Definition 2 (Ordinal potential game ). A game is an ordinal
potential game (OPG) if there exists an ordinal potential
function φ : A1× · · · ×AN → R such that for all n ∈ N , all
an ∈ An, and a′n ∈ An, the following holds:
un(B, an, a−n)− un(B, a′n, a−n) > 0
⇔ φ(B, an, a−n)− φ(B, a′n, a−n) > 0
(9)
That is, the change in the utility function caused by the
unilateral action change of an arbitrary each user has the same
trend with that in the ordinal potential function. Following the
similar methodology presented in [16], we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. For any active user set B, the state-based
spectrum access game F1 is an ordinal potential game.
Proof: For presentation, for any active user set B and an
arbitrary user ∀n ∈ B, denote
vn(B, an, a−n) = −
∑
i∈B\{n}:ai=an
PiPnd
−α
in , (10)
which can be regarded as the weighted interference [19]
experienced by user n. Define φ : A1 × · · · × A|B| → R
as
φ(B, an, a−n) =
∑
n∈B
vn(B, an, a−n)
= −
∑
n∈B
∑
i∈B\{n}:ai=an
PiPnd
−α
in ,
(11)
which is the aggregate weighted interference experienced by
all the active users.
If an arbitrary player n unilaterally changes its channel
selection from an to a∗n, then the change in vn caused by
this unilateral change is as follows:
vn(B, a∗n, a−n)− vn(B, an, a−n)
=
∑
i∈B\{n}:ai=an
PiPnd
−α
in −
∑
i∈B\{n}:ai=a∗n
PiPnd
−α
in
(12)
For analysis convenience, denote the users choosing the
same channel with user n as In(an,B) = {i ∈ B\n : ai =
an}. Then, the change in potential function φ caused by the
unilateral change of user n can be expressed as follows:
φ(B, a∗n, a−n)− φ(B, an, a−n)
= vn(B, a∗n, a−n)− vn(B, an, a−n)
+
∑
i∈In(a∗n,B)
PnPid
−α
ni −
∑
i∈In(an,B)
PnPid
−α
ni
= 2
(
vn(B, a∗n, a−n)− vn(B, an, a−n)
) (13)
Since un and vn is related by:
un(B, an, a−n) = B log
(
1 +
Pnd
−α
n
−vn(B, an, a−n)/Pn + σ
)
,
(14)
and log
(
1 +
Pnd
−α
n
−x/Pn+σ
)
is increasing with respect to x, it
follows that:(
un(B, a∗n, a−n)− un(B, an, a−n)
)
×
(
vn(B, a
∗
n, a−n)− vn(B, an, a−n)
)
≥ 0, ∀an, a
∗
n ∈ An
(15)
4For any active user set B, combining (13) and (15) yields the
following:
(
un(B, a∗n, a−n)− un(B, an, a−n)
)
×
(
φ(B, a∗n, a−n)− φ(B, an, a−n)
)
≥ 0, ∀an, a∗n ∈ An
(16)
which satisfies the definition of OPG, as characterized by (9).
Thus, the state-based spectrum access game F1 is an ordinal
potential game with φ serving as the potential function, which
proves Theorem 1.
2) Robust spectrum access game: As discussed above, it
is not feasible to perform optimization for each active user
set since the network is always changing. Thus, based on the
state-based spectrum access game F1, we formulate a robust
spectrum game below. Specifically, the robust spectrum access
game is denoted as F2 = [N , {An}n∈N , {ωn}n∈N ], where
N = {1, . . . , N} is a set of players (users), An is a set of
available actions (channels) for user n, and ωn is the utility
function of player n. The utility function in robust spectrum
access game is defined as the expected available transmission
rate over all possible active user sets [22], [23], [25], i.e.,
ωn(an, a−n) = EB[un(B, an, a−n)] =
∑
B∈Γ
µ(B)un(B, an, a−n)
(17)
Similarly, the robust spectrum access game can be expressed
as:
(F2) : max
an∈An
ωn(an, a−n), ∀n ∈ N . (18)
Theorem 2. The robust spectrum access game F2 is also an
ordinal potential game.
Proof: We define the potential function as:
Φ(an, a−n) = EB
[
φ(B, an, a−n)
]
, (19)
where φ is specified by (11).
If an arbitrary player n unilaterally changes its channel
selection from an to a∗n, then the change in wn caused by
this unilateral change is as follows:
ωn(a
∗
n, a−n)− ωn(an, a−n)
= EB[un(B, a∗n, a−n)− un(B, an, a−n)]
(20)
Similarly, the challenge in the Φ is determined by:
Φ(a∗n, a−n)− Φ(an, a−n)
= EB[φ(B, a∗n, a−n)− φ(B, an, a−n)]
(21)
Using the result obtained in (16), the following always holds:
(
ωn(a
∗
n, a−n)− ωn(an, a−n)
)
×
(
Φ(a∗n, a−n)− Φ(an, a−n)
)
≥ 0, ∀an, a∗n ∈ An
(22)
Thus, it is proved that the robust spectrum access game F2 is
also an ordinal potential game with Φ(an, a−n) serving as the
potential function.
3) Discussion on the game models: Ordinal potential game
(OPG) admits the following two promising features [24]: (i)
every OPG has at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
and (ii) an action profile that maximizes the ordinal potential
function is also a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Some further
discussions on the two spectrum game models are listed below:
• Both the state-based and robust spectrum access games
have at least one pure strategy NE.
• For the state-based spectrum access game, the aggregate
weighted interference serves as the potential function, as
specified by (11). For the robust spectrum access game,
the expected aggregate weighted interference serve as the
potential game, as specified by (19). Thus, it is known all
the NEs of the games minimize the (expected) aggregate
weighted interference respectively. Furthermore, it has
been shown that minimizing lower weighted interference
leads to higher throughput [19]–[21]. Thus, it can be
expected that the two games would also achieve high
throughput.
B. Distributed learning for achieving Nash equilibria
As the expected aggregate interference serves as the po-
tential function for the robust spectrum access game, it is
desirable to develop distributed algorithms to achieve the Nash
equilibria. Conventional algorithms in the game community,
e.g., best response dynamic [24], fictitious play [26] and spatial
adaptive play [27], can not be applied since they need informa-
tion exchange among the players. To eliminate the requirement
of information exchange, some distributed algorithms have
been applied in wireless applications, e.g., MAX-logit [28]
and Q-learning [29]. However, B-logit, and MAX-logit are
only suitable for static environment; although Q-learning can
be applied in dynamic networks, its convergence in multiuser
environment can not be guaranteed.
In this paper, we propose a learning-based distributed spec-
trum access algorithm, which is mainly based the stochastic
learning automata [30], [31]. To begin with, denote qn(k) =
{qn1(k), . . . , qn|An|(k)} as the mixed strategy of player n
in the kth slot, in which qnm is the probability of choosing
channel m. The key ideas of the proposed distributed learning
algorithm are: i) the active users choose the channels according
to their mixed strategies, and then update their mixed strategies
based on the received payoffs, and iii) an inactive user does
nothing. Specifically, the learning procedure is as follows:
Initialization: set k = 1 and set the initial mixed strategy of
each user as qnm(k) = 1|An| , ∀n ∈ N , ∀m ∈ An.
Loop for k = 1, 2, . . .
Denote B(k) as the active user set in the current slot.
1). Channel selection: according to its current mixed
strategy qn(k), any active user n in B(k) randomly chooses
a channel an(k) from its available channel set An in slot k.
2). Channel access and transmit: All the active users trans-
mit on the chosen channels, and they receive the instantaneous
transmission throughput Rn(k), which is determined by (3).
3). Update mixed strategy: All the active users n ∈ B(k)
5update their mixed strategies according to the following rules:
qnm(k + 1) = qnm(k) + brn(k)(1 − qnm(k)),m = an(k)
qnm(k + 1) = qnm(k)− brn(k)qnm(k), m 6= an(k),
(23)
where b is the learning step size, and rn(k) is the normalized
received payoff defined as follows:
rn(k) =
Rn(k)
Rmaxn
, (24)
where Rmaxn is the interference-free transmission throughput
of user n , i.e., Rmaxn = B log
(
1 +
Pnd
−α
n
σ
)
.
All the inactive users keep their mixed strategies unchanged,
i.e.,
qn(k + 1) = qn(k), ∀n ∈ N\B(k) (25)
End loop
The rationale behind the update rule (23) is as follows: when
a channel is selected and a positive payoff is received, the
probability of choosing the channel in the next step increases
while the probabilities of choosing other channels decrease
accordingly. When all the players adhere to this rule, the sys-
tem will finally converge to a stable state. Note that the above
learning algorithm is fully distributed since an active user only
needs its individual action-payoff information. Furthermore,
its asymptotical convergence property is characterized by the
following theorem.
Theorem 3. When the learning step size goes sufficiently
small, i.e., b→ 0, the proposed distributed learning algorithm
asymptotically converges to a pure strategy NE point of robust
spectrum access game F2.
Proof: It has been rigorously proved that the stochastic
learning automata converges to pure strategy Nash equilibria of
exact potential games in [32]. In methodology, the differences
in this work are summarized as: i) all the users are always
active in [32], while they are randomly active or inactive in
this work, and ii) for exact potential games, the change in the
utility function cased by the unilateral action change of an
arbitrary user is the same with that in the potential function,
i.e.,
un(an, a−n)− un(a′n, a−n) = φ(an, a−n)− φ(a
′
n, a−n)
(26)
When proving the convergence for exact potential games,
the following inequality is vital (See equation (C.40) in [32]):(
un(an, a−n)− un(a′n, a−n)
)(
φ(an, a−n)− φ(a′n, a−n)
)
≥ 0
(27)
Note that the above inequality also holds for ordinal potential
games (See equation (16)). Thus, following similar lines for
the proof given in [32] (Theorem 5), and with some additional
modifications for processing the user active probability λn
[23], this theorem can be proved. However, to avoid unneces-
sary repetition, the detailed proof is omitted.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The simulation scenario follows the setting given in [16].
The cognitive APs are randomly located in a 500m×500m
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Fig. 2. A network consisting of eight cognitive APs. By inquiring the
geo-location spectrum database, each AP knows its available channel set
and the transmitting transmission power, e.g, the available channel set and
transmission power of AP 1 are {1, 2} and 350 mW, respectively.
square area. There are M = 5 channels with bandwidth
B = 6MHz, the noise power is σ = −100 dBm, and the
path loss factor is α = 4. The distance between AP n and its
associated boundary user is dn = 20 m. By inquiring the geo-
location spectrum database, each AP operates with a specific
transmission power Pn and has a different set of available
channels. The step size for the learning algorithm is b = 0.1.
A. Convergence behavior
We consider a specific network which is shown in Fig. 2.
Due to the different locations, the action (available channel)
sets of the users are different. For example, the action set
of users 1, 2, 3 and 4 are A1 = {1, 2}, A2 = {2, 3, 4},
A3 = {1, 3, 4} and A4 = {3, 4} respectively. For presentation,
it is assumed that all the users have the same active probability
λ = 0.8. The convergence behavior of the proposed distributed
spectrum access algorithm is shown in Fig. 3. Specifically,
the channel selection probabilities of users 2, 3 and 4 are
presented. It is noted that the channel selection probabilities
of user 2 converges {0, 0, 1} over its available channel set
{2, 3, 4}, which means that it finally chooses channel 4 for
data transmission. Similarly, the selection probabilities of
users 3 and 4 also finally converge. The results validate the
convergence of the proposed distributed learning algorithm.
B. Throughput performance
For comparison, we consider four approaches: optimal,
best NE, worst NE and the distributed learning algorithm.
1) Optimal: problem P2 is solved directly in a centralized
manner. Due to the fact it is a combinatorial optimization
problem, we apply the exhaustive search approach to obtain
the optimal solution. 2) Best NE and worst NE: by assuming
that information exchange among the users is available, the
best response algorithm [24] is applied to achieve pure strategy
NE of the robust spectrum access game F2 in a distributed
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Fig. 3. The convergence of the proposed distributed learning algorithm.
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Fig. 4. The expected throughput versus the active probabilities of the users.
manner. We carried out 500 independent trails and then take
the best one and worst one respectively. Note that the best
NE and worst NE serve as the upper and lower bounds of the
game. 3) The proposed distributed learning: in the absence of
information exchange and centralized controller, all the users
adhere to the proposed distributed learning algorithm.
First, we evaluate the throughput performance for the spe-
cific network shown in Fig. 2. For presentation, all the users
have the same active probability. The expected throughput
when varying the user active probability is shown in Fig.
4. The result of the proposed learning is by simulating 200
independent trials and then taking the expected results. Some
important results can be observed from the figure: i) the best
NE is almost the same with the optimal solution, while the
throughput gap between the worse NE and the optimal solution
is trivial, which validate the effectiveness of the proposed
robust spectrum game. ii) the proposed distributed learning is
very close to the optimal one. Note that some similar numerical
results on the throughput comparison were reported in [22].
Secondly, we also consider the specific network shown in
Fig. 2, but the active probabilities of the users are different.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
T
h
e
 e
x
p
e
c
te
d
 s
y
s
te
m
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t 
(M
b
p
s
)
Optimal (exhaustive search)
Best NE
Worse NE
Learning
Fig. 5. The throughput performance comparison for six scenarios with
heterogeneous active probabilities.
Specifically, the active probabilities of the users are set to
{0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8} (tagged as Scenario 1),
{0.3, 0.3, 0.3, 0.6, 0.6, 0.9, 0.9, 0.9} (tagged as Scenario 2),
{0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8} (tagged as Scenario 3),
{0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6} (tagged as Scenario 4),
{0.3, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.7} (tagged as Scenario 5),
{0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.7} (tagged as Scenario 6),
respectively. The throughput comparison results are shown in
Fig. 5. It also noted from the figure that for the scenarios with
heterogeneous active probabilities, the best NE is almost the
same with the optimal solution and the proposed distributed
learning is close to the optimal one. These results validate
the effectiveness of the formulated spectrum access game as
well as the proposed distributed learning algorithm, in both
homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios.
Thirdly, we evaluate the throughput performance for general
networks. Specifically, the cognitive APs are randomly located
in the square region. Each channel is independently vacant
with probability θ = 0.7 for each AP, and the transmis-
sion power of each AP is randomly chosen from the set
{100, 200, 250, 300, 350, 280, 400}mW. The throughput com-
parison when varying the number of cognitive APs is shown
in Fig. 6. For each number of APs, e.g., N = 10, we simulate
100 independent topologies and take the average result. When
the network scales up, exhaustive search is not feasible due to
the heavy computational complexity. However, it is believed
that the best NE would be very close to the optimal one. It is
shown from the figure that the proposed distributed learning
is close to the best NE, which again validates the proposed
game-theoretic solution. Also, as the network scales up, the
normalized throughput decreases due to the increase in the
mutual interference, as can be expected.
To summarize, the simulation results show that the best NE
is almost the same with optimal solution, and the proposed
distributed learning algorithm is very close to the optimal one.
Recalling the dynamic and incomplete information constraints
in the considered system, we believe that the proposed game-
theoretic learning solution is desirable for practical applica-
tions.
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Fig. 6. The throughput performance comparison for general networks (the
active probabilities of all the users are λ = 0.8).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the problem of database-assisted
spectrum access in dynamic networks, in which the active user
set is varying. Since there is no central controller, it encounters
dynamic and incomplete information constraints. To solve
this challenge, we formulated a state-based spectrum access
game and a robust spectrum access game. We proved that the
two games are ordinal potential games with the (expected)
aggregate interference serving as the potential functions, and
proposed a distributed learning algorithm without information
exchange to achieve the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE)
of the games. Simulation results show that the best NE is
almost the same with the optimal solution and the achievable
throughput of the proposed learning algorithm is very close
to the optimal one, which validates the effectiveness of the
proposed game-theoretic solution. Note that there are still
some new challenges and open issues to be studied. For exam-
ple, users can access more than one channel when equipped
with the multiple radio technology. A game-theoretic carrier
aggregation in unlicensed spectrum bands is ongoing and will
be reported soon.
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